Man who killed 3 people in 2016 Thanksgiving crash must serve life in prison

Citing the “clear and unambiguous language” of the statute, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on Wednesday ruled that a man responsible for killing a family of three in a fiery Thanksgiving Day crash in 2016 must serve a mandatory term of life in prison.

Demetrius Coleman, 28, of Homewood, was found guilty by a jury of three separate counts of third-degree murder for the Nov. 24, 2016, crash at the intersection of Routes 30 and 48 in North Versailles.

Coleman, who reached speeds of 100 mph, was fleeing from a traffic stop that afternoon when he crashed into a Ford Taurus carrying Kaylie Meininger, 21; her fiance, David Bianco, 29; and their 2-year-old daughter, Annika.

Coleman went to trial in March 2019 and was convicted.

Prosecutors sought a mandatory life prison term for Coleman, even though Pennsylvania law sets the maximum penalty for third-degree murder at 20 to 40 years.

The Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office asked that Coleman be sentenced under another statute, that says that anyone convicted of third-degree murder “who has previously been convicted at any time of murder or voluntary manslaughter … shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.”

Common Pleas trial Judge David R. Cashman rejected the prosecution’s request, calling it “illogical and ludicrous,” because Coleman’s convictions occurred simultaneously.

He ordered Coleman to serve 70 to 140 years in prison.

The DA’s office appealed, and the state Superior Court ruled in its favor in February 2021, ordering Coleman to be re-sentenced. He filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which heard oral argument in April.

During the session, both parties focused on the interpretation of the word “previously” in the statute.

Coleman’s attorney argued that “previously” was used purposefully and was intended to target a person who is a repeat offender — not someone whose criminal acts occurred simultaneously.

But the district attorney’s office argued that the language of the statute specifically states “previously convicted at any time.”

In the 22-page majority opinion issued Wednesday, the court agreed with the prosecution, saying that the statute must be interpreted through plain definitions of each word.

“Giving the most pertinent terms their plain and ordinary meaning, the term ‘previously’ is defined as ‘beforehand, hitherto, antecedently,’ and the term ‘previous’ is defined as ‘going or existing before in time,’” wrote Justice Kevin Brobson.“[T]hrough use of the terms ‘at any time,’ the General Assembly made clear that there is no limitation relative to a person’s previous conviction that would preclude application of the sentencing enhancement.

“[S]o long as a person convicted of third-degree murder has previously been convicted of murder at any point in time, the sentencing enhancement applies to that person.”

In a dissenting opinion, Justice David Wecht wrote that it was clear that the legislature was targeting repeat offenders when the statute was written.

“Were the objective anything other than punishing a person who has been convicted of murder after already having been given a second chance at freedom following an earlier murder conviction, undoubtedly the General Assembly would have said so,” Wecht wrote.